Abstract-We introduce a Hyper Natural Deduction system as an extension of Gentzen's Natural Deduction system. A Hyper Natural Deduction consists of a finite set of derivations which may use, beside typical Natural Deduction rules, additional rules providing means for communication between derivations. We show that our Hyper Natural Deduction system is sound and complete for infinite-valued propositional Gödel Logic, by giving translations to and from Avron's Hypersequent Calculus. We also provide conversions for normalisation and prove the existence of normal forms for our Hyper Natural Deduction system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Curry-Howard correspondences represent a fruitful paradigm in the development of proof theory and computer science, which are well-established for sequential programming. The original Curry-Howard correspondence connects intuitionistic natural deduction and λ-calculus. Following the seminal work by Griffen [1] , much work has been done extending Curry-Howard correspondences to other types of logics [2] - [4] . Current research is aiming for extensions to concurrent programming [5] , [6] . Herein, process calculi [7] and their connections to linear logic have taken a prominent role [8] , [9] , but linear logic's lack of good algebraic/relational semantics creates a hurdle. A different approach has been taken in [10] , pointing out the relation between process calculi and linear intermediate logics, aka Gödel logics.
On the proof theoretic side, the Hypersequent Calculus introduced by Avron [11] is a well-studied formalism for investigating intermediate logics. Starting with Gentzen's sequent calculus [12] for intuitionistic and classical logic, sequent systems have developed into the framework of choice for proof-theoretic investigations of a wide variety of logics. The extension to hypersequents by Avron has started a new rush of activity, and nowadays Hypersequent calculi for a wide variety of non-classical logics as well as modal logics have been found [13] - [15] .
Avron's Hypersequent Calculus is conjectured to also model a form of communication between processes. Previous approaches to explicate this conjecture can be distinguished into either semantical (computational side) or syntactic (proof theoretic side) ones. Examples of the first category are game theoretic interpretation [16] 
and extensions of the λ-calculus
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to work with Gödel logics [17] . While these approaches from the semantical side look tempting, they either failed to connect to the proof-theoretic side, or didn't provide a computational interpretation.
On the syntactical side, Baaz et al. [18] introduced a Hyper Natural Deduction system which operates on the level of hyper derivations, that is, hyper sequences of derivations. Their system lacks a normalisation procedure via conversions -normalisation is proved by translation into Hypersequent Calculus, followed by cut-elimination and re-translation. Consequently, they do not obtain a computational interpretation via a Curry-Howard correspondence. In contrast to this, our Hyper Natural Deduction system operates on the level of derivations. This allows us to define a normalisation procedure based on conversions, which has the potential for having a meaningful computational interpretation. The latter is the object on ongoing research.
A. Our program
The original Curry-Howard correspondence (upper part of Figure 1 ) starts from Intuitionistic Logic (IL), IL's sequent calculus (LJ) and related natural deduction system (NJ), and connects these with the λ-calculus. We propose a similar approach for (infinite-valued propositional) Gödel Logic (GL) and its (hyper) sequent calculus (GLC). As a first step to establish similar correspondences here, the work in this paper introduces a Hyper Natural Deduction system (GLHN), that is equivalent to the Hypersequent Calculus, and thus sound and complete for Gödel logics.
Future work will be dedicated to complete the CurryHoward correspondence for Gödel logics, by seeking a term system representing the Hyper Natural Deduction system presented here, and trying to relate it to process calculi.
B. Layout of the article
In Section II, we start by briefly reviewing the main results about Gödel logics, to provide the context for Hypersequent Calculus -more details can be found in the handbook article on Gödel logics [19] . In Section III we recall Avron's Hypersequent Calculus (GLC). Section IV defines Hyper Natural Deductions (GLHN) and shows that these are closed under rules corresponding to the inferences of the Hypersequent Calculus. Section V provides translations between GLC and GLHN, proving soundness and completeness of the new system with respect to infinite-valued propositional Gödel logic. Section VI provides a proof of weak normalisation for GLHN. Conclusions and future work are discussed in Section VII.
II. GÖDEL LOGICS Gödel [20] introduced propositional finite-valued Gödel logics to show that intuitionistic logic does not have a finite characteristic matrix. These logics provide the first examples of intermediate logics, which lie in strength between classical and intuitionistic logics. Dummett [21] was the first to study infinite-valued propositional Gödel logics. He axiomatised this logic as intuitionistic logic extended by the linearity axiom (A → B) ∨ (B → A). Infinite-valued propositional Gödel logic is also called Gödel-Dummett logic or Dummett's LC. In terms of Kripke semantics, the linearity axiom selects those accessibility relations which are linear orders.
Extending Gödel logics to first-order logic has some surprising consequences: Whereas there is only one infinite-valued propositional Gödel logic, there are infinitely many different logics at the first-order level [22] - [24] , and, surprisingly, only countably many [25] . Scarpellini [26] has provided a general method to show non-axiomatisability of many infinite-valued intermediate logics. Thus, it is interesting to note that some infinite-valued Gödel logics belong to the limited class of recursively enumerable logics based on linearly ordered truth values [27] , [28] . In particular the Gödel logic based on [0, 1] is characterised by the first order Hypersequent Calculus [11] .
We consider propositional Gödel logics. Truth values V form a subset of the real interval [0, 1] that include 0 and 1. The valuation of conjunction and disjunction is given by min and max, respectively. The valuation of the implication gives 1 if the antecedent evaluates to a value less than or equal to the valuation of the succedent, otherwise to the valuation of the succedent. A formula is called valid with respect to V , if it is mapped to 1 for all valuations based on V .
The set of all formulas which are valid with respect to V is called the propositional Gödel logic based on V , and will be denoted by G 
III. HYPERSEQUENT CALCULUS
In the following a formula will always be a propositional formula. We shall use A, B, C . . . to range over formulas, and Γ, Δ, Ξ . . . to range over finite sets of formulas.
We describe a version of Avron's Hypersequent Calculus [11] following [18] . As the version based on multiconclusion sequents does not play a role for our exposition, we only define the single-conclusion version here. Thus, a sequent is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ A, where Γ is a finite set of formulas, and A is a formula. In particular, Γ being a set implies that structural rules of exchange, contraction and expansion (the converse of contraction) are build into our calculus. A hypersequent, in turn, is a finite multiset of sequents, which implies that the external version of exchange, but not contraction and expansion, is also build into our calculus. We shall use the usual hypersequent notation s 1 | . . . | s n (for the multiset consisting of s 1 , . . . , s n ), and H, H . . . to range over hypersequents. We also employ standard notations, e.g. Γ, A ⇒ B for Γ ∪ {A} ⇒ {B}, and H | s instead of H ∪ {s}, etc.
The Hypersequent Calculus for propositional Gödel logic, GLC, is given by the following axioms and rules:
. GLC is sound and complete for infinitary propositional Gödel logic GL.
As pointed out by Avron [11] , a hypersequent can be thought of as a specification of a multi-process. With respect to this interpretation the communication rule models the exchange of information within multi-processes. In the following we will define an extension of natural deduction (denoted Hyper Natural Deduction GLHN) which will be equivalent to GLC. One motivation for defining and studying GLHN is to make the kind of communication inherent in GLC under the above interpretation more explicit.
IV. HYPER NATURAL DEDUCTION
The proposed Hyper Natural Deduction system extends Gentzen's Natural Deduction system (NJ) by two main adaptations: First, we extend Gentzen's NJ by three more rules (Definition 1) intended to model split, communication and external contraction in Avron's Hypersequent Calculus. The derivation trees obtained in this system will be called 'GLHN pre-derivation' (Definition 2) -'pre-derivation' as the new rules are meaningless without further ingredients. In the simplest case where the additional rules are not used, a GLHN pre-derivation is also a NJ derivation.
The second adaptation is that we consider sets of GLHN pre-derivations. Not every set of GLHN pre-derivations will provide a structure that can be interpreted as a meaningful proof in Gödel logic. We will define 'GLHN deductions' as finite sets of GLHN pre-derivations satisfying several conditions (Definition 7). We then show that GLHN deductions correspond to GLC derivations by providing translations between the two (Theorem 3 and Corollary 2).
A. Gentzen's Natural Deduction
Our system of Hyper Natural Deductions will be based on Gentzen's Natural Deduction system NJ [12] . We will present NJ in the version given in [29] . As usual, a Natural Deduction style derivation consists of an upward rooted tree, where the nodes are formulas. Formulas at leaf nodes are called assumptions. All non-leaf nodes are carrying labels providing information about the rule which has been applied plus some other information (like which assumptions have been closed). We say that A is derivable from assumptions Γ and write Γ A if there is a derivation σ with root A such that the union of all open assumptions of σ is a subset of Γ. Derivations in NJ are generated inductively using the following initial, introduction and elimination rules:
Any formula, viewed as a tree consisting of one node, is a derivation.
Γ 
B. Rules for Hyper Natural Deduction
To define a Hyper Natural Deduction system for Gödel Logic (GLHN), we expand NJ by three new rules. Besides communication and split rules which correspond to those in GLC, we will also need a contraction rule to be able to define all conversion rules needed for normalisation. The new communication and split rules employ ideas from process algebra: They come in pairs of duals (technically realised by using so called names in the following), and the idea is that such dual labels form a connection which will be used during normalisation to "communicate" sub-derivations.
Definition 1 (Rules of GLHN). Let X be a countable infinite set of names. Let x →x be a function from X to X such that for each name x its dual namex is distinct from x, and x andx are duals of each other, that is,x = x.
The set of rules of GLHN consists of the above rules for Natural Deduction, plus the following three rules:
where x is a name in X.
The superscript k in the left rule is used to connect discharged assumptions to rule applications in the usual way; most of the time we will drop it in the following.
Definition 2 (GLHN pre-derivation). A GLHN prederivation is a tree defined using the rules of GLHN. A GLHN pre-derivation is often just called pre-derivation.
We shall use ρ, σ . . . to range over pre-derivations. Labels of the form S Furthermore, we stipulate a duality on labels as follows:
The following notations and concepts will be useful:
Definition 3. For pre-derivations ρ, ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n we define the following formulas and sets: Labels(ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) is the set of labels occurring in any of the pre-derivations ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ; Assum(ρ) is the set of not discharged assumptions of ρ; Conc(ρ) is the final conclusion, i.e., last formula, of ρ. For an occurrence of a formula A in a pre-derivation, we define the sub-pre-derivation rooted in A as the sub-tree up to and including A. An immediate sub-pre-derivation of ρ is a subpre-derivation rooted in one of the premises of the final rule of ρ.
We want to define Hyper Natural Deductions as sets of pre-derivations, with the aim to establish a correspondence to GLC. The idea is that communication and splitting labels come in pairs of duals which together correspond to instances of communication and splitting, resp., in GLC. So far, the use of communication and splitting labels in pre-derivations is not restricted, and we will have to impose various restrictions on their occurrence for the above idea to work. These restriction will impose conditions on GLHN deductions which mainly intend to model independence of parts of GLHN deductions: Non-unary rules on the sequent-level in GLC require that the derivations of their premises are independent. We will have to model this through our conditions on GLHN: For example, for each pair of dual communication labels in an GLHN deduction, the conditions will have to allow us to identify 'independent' parts of the deduction which independently justify the premises of the communication application. The following equivalence relation on pre-derivations will be needed to achieve this. Definition 4 (Induced equivalence relation and partition). For a finite set R = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n } of pre-derivations, define the following relation ∼ R on R: ρ i ∼ R ρ j if there is an l ∈ Labels(ρ i ) and l ∈ Labels(ρ j ) such that l and l are dual to each other. Note that a label is never dual to itself, thus we may have
The transitive and reflexive closure of ∼ R , denoted by ≈ R , is an equivalence relation on R.
For an arbitrary pre-derivation σ (not necessary in R) let lnk R (σ), the set of pre-derivations in R linked to σ, be
The contraction rule, which is necessary to formulate the conversion rules for the normalisation procedure, provides a challenge for expressing the above mentioned independence condition as it is the only rule which allows to combine dependent pre-derivations and thus effects equivalent classes obtained from the previously defined equivalence relation. In order to obtain a working definition of independence, we introduce the concept of expansions of pre-derivations which removes contractions and in this way splits dependent subpre-derivations into separate pre-derivations. The following definition is used only to later define appropriate equivalence relations for characterising independence. The apparent asymmetry in the definition is harmless: both options can be chosen without an effect on the induced independence of prederivations.
Definition 5 (Expansion of pre-derivations). With each prederivation ρ we associate the expansion of ρ, a set of contraction-free pre-derivations ρ * , inductively as follows: If contraction does not occur in ρ, then ρ * = {ρ}. Otherwise choose an uppermost occurrence of contraction in ρ, and let σ 1 and σ 2 be the upper left and right, respectively, sub-prederivation at this occurrence. Then ρ * is defined as the union of {σ 1 } and the expansion of the pre-derivation obtained from ρ by replacing the sub-pre-derivation rooted in the conclusion of the contraction occurrence, with σ 2 .
For a set of pre-derivations
Observe that expansions of pre-derivation do not contain contractions.
The definition of Hyper Natural Deduction will require a total order on the set of labels, which ignores duality. To express this, the following definition will be helpful:
Definition 6 (Induced orders on labels). Let L be a set of labels closed under taking duals. Let L/_ be the set of classes of dual labels in L, and let
on L/_ induces a total pre-order on L in the obvious way by
Obviously, dual labels are at the same position of the induced total pre-order.
C. Hyper Natural Deduction
We are now in the position to give the definition of our Hyper Natural Deduction system GLHN.
Definition 7 (Hyper Natural Deduction for Gödel Logic). Let R = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n } be a finite set of pre-derivations, and let be a total order on Labels(R)/_. (R, ) is called a GL Hyper Natural Deduction, or simply Hyper Natural Deduction, and is denoted GLHN, if the following conditions are satisfied: 1) (Dual labels) Labels(R) is closed under taking duals. That is, if l ∈ Labels(R), then alsol ∈ Labels(R). Recall the definition of dual labels:
and if ρ and ρ are sub-pre-derivations of pre-derivations in R rooted in the premise of rules labelled l andl, respectively, then neither ρ is a sub-tree of ρ , nor ρ a sub-tree of ρ.
is a communication label, then all sub-pre-derivations of pre-derivations in R rooted in premises of rules labelled by l are different occurrences of the same pre-derivation. 4) (Consistent splitting labelling) If l ∈ Labels(R) is a splitting label, then all sub-pre-derivations of prederivations in R rooted in premises of rules labelled by l orl are different occurrences of the same pre-derivation. 5) (Label ordering) The order of labels occurring on any path through any pre-derivation in R respects the total pre-order induced by . The ordering on paths through pre-derivations is from assumptions to conclusions. That is, we are in one of the following situations:
Denote with R the remaining pre-derivations, i.e., for the logical rules R = {ρ 2 , . . . , ρ n }, and for communication
Then we require for any such rule occurrence, that the equivalence classes of σ i with respect to ≈ R * i as sets of pre-derivations are pairwise disjoint, that is,
It is important to note that the equivalence classes are build with respect to the expansions R * i of the prederivations R i . 7) (Local dependence of contraction premises) For any occurrence of a contraction rule, we stipulate a dependency of the immediate sub-pre-derivations. With the notions from the previous condition, that is, σ 1 and σ 2 being the upper left and right, respectively, sub-prederivations of this contraction occurrence, and R , R 1 , R 2 being defined as before, we require that the two equivalence classes coincide:
8) (Global dependence of pre-derivations) The whole set R forms one equivalence class:
Note that we do not build the equivalence class with respect to expansion R * , but with respect to R.
We require that a total order on the labels is given as part of the definition of a Hyper Natural Deduction. This is not necessary as there is an efficient algorithm which, given a set of pre-derivations, checks whether such an order exists (and in this case computes it). Thus, in the following we will usually not mention this order when giving a Hyper Natural Deduction.
Observe that the previous definition induces an efficient (logspace) decision procedure to determine whether a given set of pre-derivations forms a Hyper Natural Deduction. As discussed above this is true even if the total order is omitted, as it can be computed efficiently from the set of pre-derivations.
D. Hyper rules for Hyper Natural Deduction
We will now define rules which operate on Hyper Natural Deductions. They will be useful for building Hyper Natural Deductions, needed for example in the translation from hypersequent derivations to Hyper Natural Deductions.
We start by defining a general notion of a rule operating on sets of pre-derivations which we denote a hyper rule. In the following, when saying "set of pre-derivations" we mean "finite set of pre-derivations".
Definition 8 (Hyper rule).
A hyper rule r of arity k is a k+1-ary relation where the arguments are sets of pre-derivations. If a hyper rule r of arity k > 1 is defined on some R 1 . . . , R k , R where R 1 . . . , R k , R are sets of pre-derivations, then we say that r applied to R 1 . . . , R k yields R.
A hyper rule of arity k > 1 will always satisfy that if it yields R from R 1 . . . , R k , then the sets of labels for R i , Labels(R i ) for i ≤ k, are pairwise disjoint.
We now define hyper rules based on rules for NJ, and on communication, splitting and contraction rules. Let k be the arity of the rule under consideration. For the following, assume that R i is a set of pre-derivations, and that ρ i ∈ R i , for i ≤ k. Furthermore, assume that Labels(R i ) for i ≤ k are pairwise disjoint.
Each NJ-rule r induces a corresponding hyper rule r. If r has k premises, then r has arity k. In addition to these, we have
Hyper communication rule: Assume Conc(ρ 1 ) = A, Conc(ρ 2 ) = B, and let x be a fresh name. Let
Hyper splitting rule: Assume
and let x be a fresh name. Let
Then split applied to R 1 yields
Hyper contraction rule: Assume ρ 2 is a second element in R 1 , i.e. ρ 2 ∈ R 1 \ {ρ 1 }. Furthermore, assume Conc(ρ 1 ) = A = Conc(ρ 2 ). Let
Then contr applied to R 1 yields
Definition 9 (GLHN hyper rules). The GLHN hyper rules are given by the hyper rules corresponding to NJ rules, plus the hyper communication rule com, the hyper splitting rule split, and the hyper contraction rule contr.
We have defined GLHN in an a priori or explicit way by requiring that certain properties hold for a set of prederivations. This is in contrast to a procedural definition that is often used in proof-theoretic settings. The following Lemma shows that we can take also this procedural point of view, that is, if we start from Hyper Natural Deductions and apply a GLHN hyper rule, then we again obtain a Hyper Natural Deduction. This shows that in a natural way we can create Hyper Natural Deductions by locally adding rules to pre-derivations without destroying the global properties needed for being a Hyper Natural Deduction. For example, the independence of premises requirements are preserved when applying GLHN hyper rules. Proof sketch: The proof of the stability lemma consists of meticulously checking for each GLHN rule that the resulting set of pre-derivations again forms a GLHN if the original set of pre-derivations formed GLHNs. We will only mention a few cases in detail. Let R i = {ρ 
Lemma 1 (Stability

∧-i, ∨-e, →-e, communication
Skipping the treatment of most conditions, we only discuss the critical condition 6 (indep. premises) for the case of an ∧-i rule occurrence in R. If this occurrence is the same as the final rule in ρ ∧ , then the assertion follows from the assumption that Labels(R 1 ) and Labels(R 2 ) are disjoint. Otherwise, it has to appear in either the left-upper part of ρ ∧ , i.e., ρ If it is one of the first two cases, i.e., appearing in ρ ∧ , then by the assumptions of R i being GLHNs and the disjointness of the respective label sets, also in R condition 6 (indep. premises) is satisfied for this rule occurrence.
On the other hand, if the rule appears in one of the ρ i j , then we have the following figure:
Assume without loss of generality that ρ
As R 1 is a GLHN deduction, the critical condition holds for the displayed ∧-i rule occurrence in ρ i j in R 1 . Hence we obtain that
Now consider the same ∧-i rule, but in the new set of prederivations, and let
Assume for the sake of contradiction, that the intersection contains a pre-derivation. There are three cases to be considered: (i) this pre-derivation is contained in ρ * ∧ , (ii) it is contained in one of the ρ 
as they are then also connected in the original deduction, a contradiction to the assumption that R 1 was a GLHN.
(ii) and (iii) are done similarly.
contraction In the case of the contraction rule, we are starting from slightly different assumptions, namely that the first two pre-derivations have been contracted into one. Again, we have to show that the new set is a GLHN. As in the previous case, it is easy to see that all conditions but condition 6 (indep. premises) are trivially satisfied. What remains to show is that for all other critical rules in R , condition 6 is still satisfied. We consider again only the case of ∧-i, the other cases are similar. If an application of ∧-i occurs in ρ 1 or ρ 2 , then the definition of the condition ignores the part below the binary rule, and thus the contraction anyway, so there are no changes for these rules.
On the other hand, if it occurs in some ρ k for k ≥ 3, then we have the following figure:
Let us assume without loss of generality that k = n 1 and let n = n 1 . Let
Since R 1 is a GLHN, it satisfies condition 6 (indep. premises) by assumption. Hence we have that
Consider the corresponding sets after applying the contraction rule:
Reviewing the definition of expansion, we see that the expansion of S i , and the expansion of the original S i , coincide:
As a consequence we obtain that the condition 6 (indep. premises) is also satisfied in R. Remark. Here we see the importance of defining the equivalence via the expansion. Without this, it is easy to give a counter-example: Consider the proof in GLC given in Figure 2 . The intended translation into GLHN would be:
Here, condition 6 (indep. premises) would not be satisfied for the binary rule ∧:i if we drop expansions, as both upper subpre-derivations are connected to the same pre-derivation due to the merge of contraction. By unwinding the contractions before checking the equivalence relations we can ensure that the addition of a binary rule does not disturb other binary rules.
Similar treatment of the other cases completes the proof. The Hyper Natural Deduction system given by Baaz et.al. [18] can be viewed as a description on the hyper rule level, with resulting derived hypersequent. Proof sketch: All conditions can be easily checked. The following retraction lemma provides a means for inductive proofs on the length of GLHNs. Proof sketch: By inspection of the conditions and using Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Conditions 2 (separate derivations) to 6 (indep. premises) from Definition 7 are stable when taking a subset of sub-pre-derivations. That is, if a set R of pre-derivations
A ⇒ A B ⇒ B (∧:l) B ∧ C ⇒ B (com) B ∧ C ⇒ A | A ⇒ B A ⇒ A C ⇒ C (∧:l) B ∧ C ⇒ C (com) B ∧ C ⇒ A | A ⇒ C (∧:r) B ∧ C ⇒ A | B ∧ C ⇒ A | A ⇒ B ∧ C EC B ∧ C ⇒ A | A ⇒ B ∧ C
Lemma 3 (Retraction
The following lemma provides us with a way to combine two GLHNs by concatenating them. 
Lemma 4 (Concatenation). Assume we have a GLHN
Proof sketch: By analysing the equivalence chains that connect different labels.
V. TRANSLATIONS BETWEEN HYPERSEQUENT CALCULUS AND HYPER NATURAL DEDUCTION A. Translation from GLC to GLHN
We will translate GLC derivations into GLHN. As an illustration consider the linearity formula C = (A → B) ∨ (B → A), which has the following GLC derivation:
⇒ C The corresponding GLHN deduction would look like this:
H is a syntactic sub hypersequent of H , denoted H H , if and only if there exists an injection f : {1, . . . , k} → {1, . . . , } such that for all i = 1, . . . , k,
and
Remark: If H H and H is valid, then also H is valid.
Definition 11. The derived sequent of a pre-derivation ρ, denoted Seq(ρ), is given by Assum(ρ) ⇒ Conc(ρ).
The derived hypersequent of a finite set of pre- For the other rules of GLC we use the corresponding GLHN hyper rules in combination with the Stability Lemma 1 and the Concatenation Lemma 4.
A formula A is GLC derivable if the hypersequent ⇒ A is GLC derivable. A is GLHN derivable if there is a GLHN deduction consisting of one pre-derivation ρ, which has no free assumptions and ends in A, that is, Assum(ρ) = ∅ and Conc(ρ) = A.
B. Translation from GLHN to GLC
We will show by induction on the total number of inference steps over all pre-derivations, that any GLHN deduction R = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n } can be translated into a GLC derivation. We see that as long as two branches are not connected with communication or split, the translation needs to generated independent hypersequent proofs, while as soon as they become connected, the two independent proofs need to be merged into one hypersequent proof with multiple sequents.
Which branches go into different hypersequent proofs, and which branches go into the same as different sequents, is determined by the equivalence relation ≈ R and its equivalence classes.
Theorem 3. Let R be a GLHN deduction. Then there exists a GLC derivation of the derived hypersequent HypSeq(R) of R.
Proof sketch: Fix a total order on Labels(R)/_ which comes with R being a GLHN deduction. The proof is by induction on the total number of nodes over all pre-derivations in R. As GLC has external weakening, it will be sufficient to provide a GLC-derivation for a sub-multi-set of HypSeq(R). The proof layout is as follows: We distinguish cases according to the final rules occurring in all pre-derivations in R, with the intention to apply the Retraction Lemma 3 to obtain shorter GLHNs to which we can apply the induction hypothesis. For logical rules and contractions this is always possible. The problematic cases are communication and split as we need, in order to apply the Retraction Lemma, a pair of dually labelled rules at the end of two pre-derivations, which is not guaranteed to exist in general. Therefore, we will deal with logical rules and contraction as long as this is possible, and will see that if only communication and split labels occur at the end of pre-derivations, a pair of dually labelled rules is guaranteed to exist due to Condition 5 (label order) of Definition 7.
If one of the pre-derivations in R has the form of a single node deduction consisting of just a formula A, then the GLC axiom A ⇒ A provides the required derivation.
Now assume that at least one pre-derivation in R ends in an application of a logical rule or contraction. In this case, by using the Retraction Lemma 3 and induction hypothesis, we obtain a hypersequent derivation, which we follow with the respective rules of GLC.
Finally, assume that all pre-derivations in R = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k } end in an application of communication or splitting. Let x i be the label of the last inference in ρ i , and let L = {x 1 , . . . , x k }. In order to be able to apply the Retraction Lemma 3 we need in L a pair of dual labels: Let be the pre-order on Labels(R) induced by according to Definition 6. Choose a largest element in L according to , w.l.o.g. assume this is x 1 . We will argue that the dual of x 1 is also in L. For the sake of contradiction assume that this is not the case. Then, due to Condition 1 (dual labels), x 1 has to appear somewhere in R, say in ρ i . By assumption it cannot be the label of the last rule in ρ i , x i . As there is a path through ρ i which contains both labels, we must have x 1 ≺ x i using Condition 5 (label order). This contradicts the maximality of x 1 (and thus also of x 1 ) in L.
Thus, we know that there is a pair of dual labels in L, w.l.o.g. assume these are x 1 and x 2 . Again, by using the Retraction Lemma 3 and induction hypothesis, we obtain GLC derivation(s) that can be extended with the corresponding communication rule or splitting rule of GLC.
As a consequence of the previous theorem we obtain the following corollary:
Corollaries 1 and 2 together show, using the completeness of GLC for infinitary propositional Gödel logic [11] : Corollary 3. GLHN is sound and complete for infinitary propositional Gödel logic.
VI. NORMALISATION
The natural deduction calculus NJ allows derivations to be normalised. We will describe a similar results for GLHN.
In general, we will follow [30, Chapter 6] for proving normalisation. The notion of normal derivation depends on notions like segment and cuts, which in turn need the notions minor and major premise of rules. We thus start by defining the latter for communication, split and contraction rules. As communication and split are linking different pre-derivations, we cannot define the minor premise of such a rule locally, i.e. dependent on just this rule, anymore, but have to define them in context of a GLHN deduction. During normalisation, elimination rules are permuted over minor premises of other disjunction elimination like rules (delrules, see below) until they reach an introduction rule. For communication, split and contraction the reason for calling premises "minor" is the same as above, during nomalisation elimination rules are just "permuted". But due to the nonlocal nature of minor premises for communication and split the situation now is much more involved.
We adapt the notion of segment, cut, cutrank, and critical cut from [30, Def. 6.1.2] to take the additional minor premises into account, which can be conveniently done by just defining the "del-rules" of GLHN [30, Def. 6 GLHN deduction R is a sequence A 1 , . . . , A n of consecutive occurrences of a formula A in R such that • for 1 < n, i < n, A i is a minor premise of a del-rule application in R, with conclusion A i+1 ,
• A n is not a minor premise of a del-rule application, • A 1 is not the conclusion of a del-rule application. A segment is maximal, or a cut (segment) if A n is the major premise of an E-rule, and either n > 1, or n = 1 and A 1 = A n is the conclusion of an I-rule. The cutrank CR(s) of a maximal segment s with formula A is |A|. The cutrank CR(R) of a GLHN deduction R is the maximum of the cutranks of cuts of R. If there is no cut, the cutrank of R is zero. A critical cut of R is a cut of maximal cutrank among all cuts in R. We shall use s, s for segments.
A deduction without critical cuts is said to be normal.
A. Conversions
We now extend the conversions defined in [30, Chap. 6 .1] to deal with our additional cases involving communication, splitting and contraction rules.
The detour conversions ∧-conversion, ∨-conversion and →-conversion, and the simplification conversions from [30, Chap. 6 .1] stay the same. The permutation conversion ∨-perm conversion for E-rules from [30, Chap. 6 .1] also stays the same.
We now define three more permutation conversions which deal with permuting an E-rule over a contraction, communication and split rule.
contr-perm conversion:
B com-perm conversion and split-perm conversion differ from the previous cases in that they have to be defined w.r.t. a GLHN deduction R = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n }. We will define them only for →-e, the cases for other E-rules are similar.
com-perm conversion: Consider a pair of dually labelled communication rules occurring in R. Assume the label is of the form = com x A→B,C , and that the two occurrences are of the form
Let μ be
A →-e B and define the following three pre-derivations:
Then w.r.t. this pair of dual label occurrences, R contracts to R which is obtained by applying the following three steps to R, where by "sub-tree rooted in a label-occurrence" we mean "sub-pre-derivation rooted in the conclusion of the rule carrying this label-occurrence":
• Replace all sub-trees rooted in occurrences of com x A→B,C with δ 1
• replace the sub-tree rooted in the displayed occurrence of →-e in ρ 2 with δ 2
• for all remaining occurrences of com x A→B,C , replace the sub-trees rooted in them with δ 3 . These substitutions are possible since the proof trees rooted in dual communications labels are separated (Condition 2 (separate derivations) of Definition 7).
split-perm conversion: Consider a pair of dually labelled splitting rules occurring in R. Assume the label is of the form = S x Γ,Δ , and that the two occurrences are of the form
Abbreviating sub-pre-derivations as 1 and ρ 2 can be written as
Let μ be the following pre-derivation:
B We consider cases depending on whether there are occurrences of Sx Δ,Γ other than those in occurrences of σ 4 .
Case I) Sx Δ,Γ only occurs within occurrences of σ 4 in R. Using μ, define the following two pre-derivations
W.r.t. the fixed pair of dual label occurrences, R contracts to R which is obtained by applying the following two steps to R:
• Replace all occurrences of σ 2 with δ 1 ,
• replace all occurrences of σ 4 with δ 2 . Case II) Sx Δ,Γ occurs outside occurrences of σ 4 . Using μ, define the following three pre-derivations • Replace all occurrences of σ 2 with δ 1 ;
• replace all occurrences of σ 4 with δ 2 .
• replace all remaining occurrences of σ 3 with δ 3 . These substitutions are possible since the proof trees rooted in splitting rules carrying the same label (modulo duality) are separated (Condition 2 (separate derivations) of Definition 7).
We now show that in the above cases, R again constitutes a GLHN.
Lemma 6. Contr-perm, com-perm and split-perm conversions convert GLHN deductions into GLHN deductions.
Proof sketch: For all three conversions we have to check all conditions for GLHN. All conditions besides Condition 6 (indep. premises) follow immediately from the assumption that the original figure formed a GLHN. What remains is to show that due to the reshuffling and extension of sub-pre-derivations, Condition 6 has not been violated, which can be proven by inspecting the new binary rules one by one.
We now turn the central theorem on normalisation:
Theorem 4 (Normalisation). Each GLHN deduction R reduces to a normal GLHN deduction.
Proof: We adapt the proof of normalisation [30, Theorem 6.1.8] to our setting.
We use main induction on the cutrank n of R, with a sideinduction on α = critical cut s in R ω length of s By a suitable choice of the critical cut to which we apply a conversion we can achieve that either n decreases, or that n remains constant but α decreases. Let us call s a m.c.c. (max critical cut) in R if it is a critical cut of maximal length. Choose a m.c.c. s for which no m.c.c. occurs in a branch of R above the lowest formula occurrence in s. Applying a conversion to s, the resulting R has a lower cutrank (if s has length 1, and it is the only maximal segment in R), or has the same cutrank but a lower value for α.
To see this in the case of com-perm conversion, using the notation form above, μ does not contain a m.c.c. (the original segment s has been reduced in length). The performed substitution may create many more critical cuts, but not of original maximal length, thus the number of m.c.c.'s has been reduced (which is reflected by α decreasing).
VII. CONCLUSION
We have provided a new system of Hyper Natural Deductions which is sound and complete for infinitary propositional Gödel logic. It improves the previously known system by Baaz et.al. [18] by giving a "low level" description of Hyper Natural Deduction which is closer to Natural Deduction NJ -the system of Baaz et.al. [18] can be viewed as a description on, what we call, the hyper rule level with resulting derived hypersequent.
The advantage of our system is that it allows to extend the usual conversions used to prove normalisation of NJ, to our setting, and using them to prove the existence of normal forms (weak normalisation) for Hyper Natural Deduction. In the standard Curry-Howard correspondence, a detour-conversion step (→-conversion) for natural deduction corresponds to β-reduction for λ-calculus. Thus, if we are aiming for a computational interpretation of Hyper Natural Deduction like a Curry-Howard correspondence, we need a procedural normalisation procedure like the one based on conversions. Another advantage in line with the conjecture about communication inherent in Hyper Natural Deduction mentioned in the introduction, is that the conversion rules for communication and split can be viewed as "communicating" sub-pre-derivations over a "channel" build by dual labels.
A lot of our set-up and new conversions resemble elements of process algebras. In ongoing work we are investigating this point of view by trying to provide a direct connection to some process algebra like the π-calculus. A first step will be to create a term system for the presented Hyper Natural Deduction system, with the aim to have a simpler set-up to investigate normalisation.
